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Abstract
Mixed reality (MR) technologies are emerging into the main-
stream with affordable devices like the Oculus Quest. These
devices blend the physical and virtual in novel ways that
blur the lines that exist in legal precedent, like those be-
tween speech and conduct. In this paper, we discuss the
challenges of regulating immersive technologies, focusing
on the potential for extensive data collection, and examine
the trade-offs of three potential approaches to protecting
data privacy in the context of mixed reality environments.
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Introduction
MR devices offer businesses and consumers a landscape
of opportunity for deeper interaction, immersion, image
projection, and information. Using both the digital and real
world, mixed reality technologies like virtual reality (VR) and
augmented reality (AR), occlude the usersâA˘Z´ senses to
project an experience that feels real.
As with most technology, regulation lags innovation and
faces many challenges. Too often, we only protect data
after a large breach has occurred. In MR, large amounts
of data are biometrics or biometrically-derived data (BDD),
which, unlike passwords or credit card numbers, are tied
to our intrinsic characteristics and cannot be changed after
a breach. Therefore, it’s imperative to require protection
before a breach happens.
In this paper, we build on our exploration of the privacy im-
plications of eye tracking and other biometric data use in
these technologies, by contextualizing the risks through cur-
rent regulatory approaches [10]. These are not meant to be
prescriptive, but instead to inspire debate about how best to
manage the inherent risk of large amounts of biometric and
other sensitive data types incurred by MR systems.
First, we will briefly discuss the challenges to regulating
immersive technologies, where a user’s senses, motion,
and body characteristics, as well as information about the
world around them, may be recorded and used to provide
a high fidelity experience and account for optimization. Our
focus is regulating the data output from an MR experience.
Then we will discuss three different potential approaches
for regulating this data (focused on U.S. law), contextualized
through related research in the human-computer interaction
(HCI) community. This work focuses on legal and regula-
tory approaches to protect privacy related to biometric and
data identity in MR, as listed in ByeâA˘Z´s MR Ethics frame-
work [6].
In immersive MR, a userâA˘Z´s information is required to
make the experience work. Sensors and cameras track
the bodyâA˘Z´s position and orientation in space, move-
ments, characteristics, and responses to a variety of sen-
sory stimuli. This provides the input needed to produce a
compelling environment within which the user may inter-
act, while also giving developers feedback on features that
donâA˘Z´t work, or even make consumers feel dizzy or ill [11]
(giving a new meaning to software bugs). This information
is mostly comprised of biometrically-derived data, BDD, a
category of data that is derived from a user’s intrinsic traits,
characteristics, and biometrics. For example, while a retina
scan is considered biometric data, the data output from eye
tracking would be considered BDD [9]. Typically, this data is
recorded on the userâA˘Z´s device and in the cloud.
Challenges to regulation
Despite the apparent risk of unbridled access to sensitive
user data mixed reality systems may pose, legislative move-
ment has been slow. One explanation for this may be exist-
ing law and normative precedent in the technology provider
to consumer relationship. In the 1996 Communications De-
cency Act (CDA), section 47 U.S.C. 230, the law states, "no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider" [4]. In
many cases, this provision has served to shield technology
providers from the content that users create and publish on
their platforms. In an immersive environment, this may ex-
tend to include the content and behaviors of users in the VR
space—blurring the lines of liability when it comes to how
data is shared between users and with providers.
Beyond norms that have deterred change are philosophi-
cal and fundamental questions that make legislating mixed
reality data collection and use exceedingly complex. These
include the blurred lines between speech and conduct as
well as physical and psychological harm. In the tangible
world, the line between physical conduct and verbal speech
is easier to distinguish than that of a virtual world, because
in a virtual environment, most behavior and experience is
simulated and not truly physical. Despite the lack of touch,
these experiences still feel real to users.
Jordan Belamire experienced virtual sexual harassment just
as commercial VR was becoming available. âA˘IJThe vir-
tual groping,âA˘I˙ she said, âA˘IJfeels just as real. Of course,
youâA˘Z´re not physically being touched, just like youâA˘Z´re
not actually one hundred feet off the ground, but itâA˘Z´s still
scary as hell" [5].
If all behavior, action, and speech in immersive MR is con-
sidered âA˘IJspeechâA˘I˙ because it is not completely tan-
gible, it may be protected and go un-penalized under the
First Amendment [7]. Similarly, psychological harm, be-
yond physical harm, will need further understanding and
protective legislation in these spaces. As MR creators and
providers interact with behavioral and generated data from
their ecosystems, regulatory requirements will be needed to
parse the data types and how they may be handled based
on the risks to users.
Discussion of regulatory approaches
Through their very use, immersive MR experiences incur
large amounts of sensitive user data. Based on the charac-
teristics of this data, many users may want more say over
who has access to it, and legislative bodies may be more
motivated to regulate due to a higher risk of user vulnera-
bility. In identifying the best ways to regulate this type of in-
formation, it is useful to understand the ethical trade-offs of
approaches through the context of both technology driven
methodologies and current U.S. law. Using this, we can find
paths forward that marry regulatory and technological so-
lutions in an HCI context to solve for privacy concerns in
MR.
Code as law
When developers of QuiVr were made aware of the virtual
groping that occurred in their immersive world to user, Jor-
dan Belamire, they acted quickly to find ways to solve the
problem. Ultimately, the gameâA˘Z´s engineers adapted
code to extend a âA˘IJpersonal bubbleâA˘I˙ around usersâA˘Z´
entire bodies if another user reached for them [5]. In doing
so, they provided users with the agency to protect them-
selves from perceived aggressors in the environment, effec-
tively âA˘IJoutlawingâA˘I˙ unwanted groping and other related
incidents.
Similar to this in-world example, âA˘IJcode is lawâA˘I˙, a con-
cept first popularized by Lawrence Lessig in 1999, refer-
ences the ability of technology builders and creators to
mandate âA˘IJregulationsâA˘I˙ into their usersâA˘Z´ experi-
ences by writing preferred features, behaviors, and scenar-
ios into the code, and leaving others out. In this way, im-
mersive MR systems can be designed with privacy in mind -
from interaction features, like the personal bubble in QuiVR,
to system architecture, such as, local data processing for
privacy preservation.
BDD as health data
Under HIPAA rules, individuals have the right to obtain a
copy of their protected health information (PHI), request
corrections and limits, as well as know the identity of who
has received the records [12]. Typically, PHI under HIPAA
encompasses a patientâA˘Z´s medical record or payment
history, and is considered most sensitive when linked to a
list of eighteen protected identifiers: ranging from name and
phone number to biometric identifiers like finger and voice
prints [3].
While HIPAA sets a precedent for how to handle data over
which an individual may have limited control and which may
make them vulnerable to scrutiny or discrimination, HIPAA
coverage is applied to entities not to types of data. There-
fore, to fit into the pre-existing structure, HIPAA could not
be invoked for specific categories of data, such as health or
biometric, but for commercial entities deemed to be inter-
acting with them. For example, this protects the scenario in
which Alice confides PHI to Bob, who then accidentally tells
Eve and Mallory without Alice’s consent from legal action.
This brings into question when this decision would be made,
by which criteria, and by whom. The Department of Health
and Human Services, has resisted extending HIPAA to
entities beyond health plans, health care clearing houses,
and health care providers. However, noticing gaps in these
types of oversight, policymakers have used other meth-
ods of regulating bad data use practices, such as through
the FTC Act to investigate âA˘IJunfair or deceptive prac-
ticesâA˘I˙ [1][12]. Despite the drawbacks, using HIPAA as a
framework for understanding the best basic protections for
usersâA˘Z´ sensitive data, including biometrics, could be an
important way to build on current regulatory practices.
Data as a property right
Data as a property right proposes to flip the current paradigm
on its head, putting consumers in control of their data and
able to use it as a commodity in the same ways technol-
ogy developers use their usersâA˘Z´ data today. This con-
cept was recently espoused by U.S. presidential candidate,
Andrew Yang, as a part of his proposed policy to regulate
technology firms in the 21st century [13]. In YangâA˘Z´s ver-
sion of the right to data ownership, citizens should be guar-
anteed the right to know who will use their data, opt-out of
collection and sharing, have transparency about ownership
changes and data breaches, as well as full data portability.
These mandates would affect a wide variety of technology
creators, including those creating immersive MR spaces. In
order to comply with these requirements, immersive experi-
ences may be completely altered.
Data as a property right also poses problems for the users
it claims to protect. Taking into account the ambivalence
with which many individuals click through privacy terms
and conditions, owning or controlling oneâA˘Z´s data may
not be most peopleâA˘Z´s first priority or interest [2]. Last,
treating data as a property right, or commodity, may con-
strain the way people think about or prioritize their privacy.
Grossklags found strong support for the hypothesis that
people may be willing to sell their data for money. In fact,
most participants in their empirical study were willing to
sell their personal data for little more than 25 cents, and
many waived protection of their data in the course of do-
ing so. [8]. Treating data as property, which users can own
and trade, could alter the criteria by which decisions about
data are made, reducing the principle of privacy as a right
to commodity as a trade. This shift may have an unprece-
dented and unexpected impact on the layers of society, and
requires further understanding, both technically and philo-
sophically before implementation.
Conclusion
Immersive mixed reality promises to bring consumers and
stakeholders a range of delightful, meaningful, and com-
pelling experiences beyond the realm of possibility. How-
ever, what is required to build these experiences may be
more than our society or legal system has seen to date. Us-
ing a genuine understanding of the experiences to be had,
as well as legal, technical, and social approaches that have
come before, we can build these systems consciously with
respect for individual dignity and privacy.
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